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Seeing Double: A Diplopic Aesthetic in Experience and
Performance
Samuel S. Sloan
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
ssloan2@siu.edu
This investigation uses an autoethnographic approach to investigate the
author’s personal, phenomenological experience of living with diplopia
(double vision) in order to apply the lived condition to an aesthetic form in
performance. Using Petra Kuppers’s notion of a “crip aesthetic,” this piece refunctions a potential aspect of disability, the condition of diplopia, as a way of
opening up discourses of multiplicity in art and performance. The author also
calls for others to integrate non-normative body states into their art praxis.
Keywords: Diplopia; Autoethnography; Disability Studies; Vision
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Fig. 1. Poem: “A Doubled Sense,” by author, 2009.

The excess of a doubled sense is alarming and nauseous. It presents
extra information and re-performs the world. It is a playfully and deceitfully
duplicitous sense. As with so many sources of excess, one both adapts
over time and learns to ignore the irrelevant information. However, in the
beginning, one has neither this benefit of time nor a sublimated routine for
disregarding information. In my own condition, I was beset, bewildered by
the tension between multiplicity and veracity. What is a “true,” single image?
What is the “truth” of a doubled image? How does it mean?
Samuel Sloan is a 4th year Ph.D student at Southern Illinois University Carbondale,
studying Communications at the intersections of Performance Studies and New
Media. He would like thank Craig Gingrich-Philbrook for his help through multiple
drafts, along with the eyes and input from Nichole Nicholson, Joshua Potter, Siri R.
K. LeBaron, and Benny LeMaster. The essay was presented at NCA 2011 and saw its
original format as a longer research report.
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And what is it about the left and right hemispheres of the brain that
makes these subtle differences? The talking head on the left looks an awful
lot like the one on the right; they’re moving at exactly the same time, are
dressed the same, and have the same awful haircut. The sound appears to
come from the same place, but there are definitely two heads. What? I will
proceed to try to make sense of my experience, but first, look at me in the
eyes—both of them—as I tell you this story about myself.
During the summer of the third year of my undergraduate program,
I experienced a shift in vision. The change, at first, was subtle. Being a
dedicated internet user, I first blamed it on eye fatigue. During that period
of time, I was reading web pages and book chapters for hours on end. While
that cause was a salient and reasonable explanation to others, the problems
persisted, even with rest. The funny thing was that I could not put my finger
exactly on what was different. I noticed feeling less inclined to be active,
but with the Louisiana summer sun beating down on me at that time, there
were many other reasons for that. As I slogged out of my hibernation to
participate in the world, the only sense I could make of the difference was
that everything was, well, doubled.
Method
Taken literally, the purpose of this writing is to demonstrate the existence
and validity of non-normative vision—through the discussion of a year
of my life when I was diagnosed and treated for double vision—and to
articulate the possible aesthetic and performative consequences that can be
employed alongside that reality. Taken figuratively, this aesthetic condition
has the ability to dissociate vision, generating disorienting narrative selves,
in the postmodern sense. Just how can we stage bodily experience, and more
importantly, how can a person’s unique perceptual world aesthetically enter
into art and performance as a conceptual layer?
This research paper is an autoethnographic text that begins from an
exploration of my experience of being diagnosed with adult-onset diplopia
(double vision); relays issues present in medicalized discourses of eye care;
makes conceptual links to postmodern ontologies of vision; and moves
forward to apply my phenomenological experience of disability—using
Petra Kupper’s notion of a “crip aesthetic,” to aesthetic possibilities within
the realms of performance and new media.
Therefore, I place this text firmly in the areas of autoethnography and
performance studies, of intellectual and performance praxis, following
Craig Gingrich-Philbrook’s calls toward a praxis where “performers who
view their work autoethnographically (and vice versa) must do more to
articulate subjugated knowledges themselves, lost arts, hidden experiences”
(311). In order to do this, I have set up this essay in the form of a mystory,
using a mixture of voices that flow back and forth between discourses of the
“personal,” the “popular,” and “professional”—the tripartite criteria which
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Michael and Ruth Bowman set forth as a potential mystory formula in their
conception of autoethnography (165), created through an interpretation of
Gregory Ulmer’s mystoriography (304).
A Struggle for Orientation
Before diagnosis, I understood my double vision merely as disorientation.
Weeks of this condition only brought me more of the same, my field of vision
splitting in two: stop signs were doubled, people were doubled, and crowds
were confusing. The rules of reality did not seem to apply anymore. Goffman
asserts that “a performer [in everyday life or in conspicuous performance]
tends to conceal or underplay those activities, facts, and motives which are
incompatible with an idealized version of himself [or herself] and his [or
her] products” (48). This way of thinking or behaving—perhaps heightened
through my own previous history of stage acting—led me to want to downplay
my obvious gaps in functioning with acute diplopia, and I went about my
daily business as if nothing had changed. Here, I would like to functionally
define this drive to maintain face as an aspect of what I will refer to as
“consensual reality,” or that plane where beings-in-the-world more or less
agree upon a kind of physical or metaphysical space—virtualized realms
such as cyberspace included—where objects and entities can be mutually
co-constructed among subjectivities.
On a practical level, the situation of my diplopic experience is
a bit like asking two people to stand side-by-side and then talking to the
empty space between them. The task, in everyday life, seems absurd; yet,
in those early times, I experienced it every day. It made me question where
we put the identity of people, of objects. The idea of having a literal “space
between” the same body reminded me of reading in-between the lines of a
text/performance. In a way, the condition points to an inability to locate an
“actual” reality or, at least, a suggestion of a possible “living heteroglossia,”
a multiplicity that is always already at least double within a “normative”
visual system. Yet, I had the ability to point to the “reality” that lay between
the double. Both signifiers—like bodies standing side-by-side—did point
to a single sign—a person—but those signifiers were in constant contest
for dominance: whether it was a pair of my best friend or the same word
competing with itself and others on a street sign.
To participate in consensual reality, I could take the necessary time
to explain what I was seeing, but I could just as easily pretend that nothing
was different about my visual field. As Nicolas Bourriaud claims about
aesthetic sensibility:
So reality is what I talk about with a third party. It can
only be defined as a product of negotiation. Escaping
from reality is “mad.” Somebody sees an orange rabbit
on my shoulder, but I can’t see it. So discussion weakens
and shrinks. To find a negotiating space, I must pretend
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 12, 2013: Sloan
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to see this orange rabbit on my shoulder. Imagination
seems like a prosthesis affixed to the real so as to produce
more intercourse between the interlocutors. So the goal
of art is to reduce the mechanical share in us. Its aim is to
destroy any a priori agreement about what is perceived.
(Relational Aesthetics 80)
I take Bourriaud’s words as a point of departure for my own diplopic
aesthetic that, at its core, hopes to defamiliarize such a priori ways of seeing
the world in favor of a more playful relationship with vision, one that does
not completely disregard the difference. In this regard, I must say that I’ve
grown fond, in the last few years, of talking to my orange rabbit friends,
metaphorically speaking. One might dare say that it can even be fun.
In studies with small mammals, when a binocular animal—one with
human-like stereoscopic vision—is raised from birth with one eye covered,
“monocular form deprivation can cause massive changes in cortical
physiology that result in devastating and permanent loss of spatial vision”
(Wolfe, Kluender, & Levi 71). This severe case points to the vital connection
between physiology and the mind’s ability to construct perception. However,
in cases of a slight crossed disparity error, such as was the case in my double
vision, the competing forces are what is known as “binocular rivalry.” This
is “the competition between the two eyes for control of visual perception”
(Wolfe, Kluender, & Levi 149).
When watching a person, I would often let one eye be dominant over
the other and ask myself, “Which person is the actual person and which is
the ghostly doppelgänger?” This had an important effect, as I would focus
my attention on that “version” of the person who had the most opacity. In
truth, if I wanted to throw a ball at that person, I would have to throw it in the
middle of the pair. However, when I first tried to split my focus between the
two, I usually found myself unable to process the situation in a “normal” way.
Acceptance of Disorientation
More to the point, my migraines at this time were not caused by
mere dizziness; the constant work of trying and failing to fuse each
eye’s information together contributed to the strain. I suppose my ocular
muscles—and visual sensory system—remembered what it felt like to fuse,
to normalize two optical fields into one picture. They perpetually tried and
failed. Living with diplopia often turned into a game or constant visual joke,
much like Roger Caillois’s notion of play “in ilinx,” where one “gratifies
the desire to temporarily destroy his bodily equilibrium, escape the tyranny
of his ordinary perception, and provoke[s] the abdication of conscience”
(44). The everyday correlate is very common if you spin in a circle to get
dizzy, ride a roller coaster, or consume alcohol with the intent of escaping
neurotypical body-states.
Quite like being perpetually dizzy or disoriented, I chose to frame my
4

double vision as playful ilinx. This reframing was an important coping
strategy. Over time, I began to story my body less in terms of a medical
diagnosis—something in need of treatment—and more as an aesthetic
condition—a unique perspective on the world. Even after I acquired orthoptic
corrections, glasses with prism lenses, I still would revel in this strange thing
my body was doing, that I was doing. After all, I had a limited amount of
control. I could choose to fight the splitting or choose to keep it doubled,
orienting differently to my disorientation.
My search for an artistic form that matches my experience is related
to Beardslee’s discussion of “the disorientating story, the story that assaults
our expectations and pulls us out of the world to which we have become
accustomed” (167). In this manner, Beardslee is trying to define a new
aesthetic story that he sees being crafted in the world: the disorienting
narrative. Far from a mere night of ilinx, he asserts that such stories usurp
utopian aims, seek meanings “beneath the surface,” and trouble notions of
“closure” in storytelling (Beardslee 171). Thus, in the explication of my story,
I have made the conscious decision not to use only typographic play to present
my condition. Rather, I wish to explain—and maintain the complexities
within—the particularities of the “chaotic and broken experience” (Beardslee
171) which led me to question the tyranny of signifier/signified dyads in
art and my own visual system. Here, I nest myself between an “accepted
reality” of normative, monocular vision and my own explicit stereopsiswith-a-difference.
Citing an often-forgotten history of pre-enlightenment art, Martin Jay
questions this aesthetic of the Western monocular viewpoint when he asserts
that the “medieval assumption of multiple vantage points from which a
scene could be painted” shifted into a position where “the beholder was now
the privileged center of perspectival vision, [. . .] a monocular, unblinking
fixed eye (or more precisely, abstract point), rather than the two active,
stereoscopic eyes of embodied actual vision” (Jay 54). The medieval aesthetic
of multiplicity, perhaps one—before the advent of modern medicine—that
included the experiences of non-normative body states, mutated into what
is now a largely unquestioned canon of vanishing point perspective, with
a normative, “monocular” observer. The lesson is clear: aesthetics have
ideologies, philosophies, and potentially lived body states embedded within
them.
By attempting to capture my sense of vision in aesthetic form, I am
attempting to subvert “the assumption”—in modernist storytelling practices
of orientation—“that there [is] an overall story,” a “unified story, coming to a
conclusion that tie[s] up all the loose ends” (Beardslee 164). Just what sense
can I make of sense anyway? I recognize that I can only create a heuristic
to describe my embodiments, and this heuristic will never fully capture my
experience. I have made my peace with this lack of closure, like I have made
my peace with the notion that I will always have some recurring double
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 12, 2013: Sloan
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vision. I feel as if I can only dance in ludic recombinations of sight, playing
with signifiers: slips of vision, like slips of language. What, then, happens
when the play of ilinx becomes serious?
A Look at Driving
I was scheduled for my driving test weeks in advance of the onset of
the diplopia. Not disclosing this, I simply went through with the test. Thus,
my first experiences driving were doubled: double stoplights, double cars,
and doubled anxiety. People asked me, “How in the world do you find the
middle of the road when you’re driving with diplopia?” I politely answered
that I simply look into the distance where the two roads meet or where the
two cars intersect. The middle point between the center of one car and the
center of its double is the place where the actual middle is, where the actual
car is. This becomes very important while driving, very important. Using
this basic knowledge and my performance skills, I was able to pretend that
I was not literally on the edge of my seat, both of them, and received my
license that very day. Certainly, there is a certain feeling of danger to driving
with diplopia, but at the same time, once you sublimate the extra information
and learn to live with the difference, it makes as much sense as any other
novel sensory input: writing while listening to music, walking while eating,
or wearing polarized lenses during a movie to simulate the already-existent
three dimensions that seem to come so easily to other people.
Perhaps I should not be so cavalier about what others may perceive as
an admission of recklessness, but in this case, I think it noteworthy that this
kind of feigning of consensual experience allows for an important space of
passing for those with invisible disabilities. In some ways, I had to disallow
the orienting master narrative of driving—that one should have “perfect”
20/20 vision at all times—in order to narrate, for myself, my own disorienting
story of being able to drive with double vision. This aspect of passing was
essential for survival in the city, and to this day, I have never been in a major
traffic accident. Since I did accomplish some driving in my life before I was
diagnosed, I sometimes wonder if the driving lessons showed me a disparity
that already existed in an extremely heightened way. Perhaps, I’ll never be
able to know this in any way other than embodied experience.
Staying in the center of a road is the same with double vision; there are
merely two roads. If a visual scene is too confusing, one can always sport
a certain pirate accessory to cover an eye, as I still do on certain occasions.
After all, plenty of folks with vision in only one eye or varying degrees of
strabismus also drive, even if that narrative is not referenced in a DMV
driver’s pamphlet. Often, living long term with this condition, a person will
“turn off” the extra information from one eye. This is certainly the case when
one or both eyes are angled so far out that visual fields from each eye refuse
to overlap. However, for those of us who have a disparity closer to the center,
we must take Robert Frost’s advice: making our own sense, with two roads
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to travel by. In this vein of multiplying perspectives, and in an effort to more
fully explain my desire to recreate double vision in performance, the next
section covers Kupper’s idea of aestheticizing disability as a potential model
for postmodern constructions of art, visual or otherwise.
The Crip Aesthetic
Petra Kuppers talks about “the violence of normalization” in her
“Performing Determinism: Disability Culture Poetry” (90). She analyzes
the poetry of Jim Ferris (a prominent disabilities studies scholar, born with
a leg-length discrepancy), referencing those violent acts of correcting bodies
that society deems to be incorrect. In this piece, Kuppers praises Ferris’s
poetry which she feels captures the gait of Ferris’s walk—modified by
his orthopedic shoe—in its meter. Kuppers’s argument for a “crip culture”
aesthetic engenders a burgeoning space for narratives and poetry that reflect
the experiences of bodies that do not conform to normal standards (95-98). I
see her crip aesthetic as a call for a model of creation whereby artists engage
their embodiment of disability by including traces of it in layers of their
work. I identify myself as a temporarily able-bodied person, a TAB, with a
kind of invisible disability, so I wish to call on my continued experience with
double vision as a somatic marker from which I can begin to understand the
normalization of “good vision.”
As Ferris’s leg did not take well to the initial surgery and leg breaking,
he found a new, enlivened aesthetic in the difference, wearing an orthopedic
shoe which allowed him to walk differently with a cadence that influences his
crip poetry (Kuppers 91-92). Personally, my orthoptic prism correction lenses
allowed me to see the world through a normalizing correction. However,
even as my eyes turned more clearly to the center, I still found differences
in vision when removing my orthoptic appendage. To be cliché, my vision
was straightened but not narrowed. The corners of my vision often remained
doubled, and doubling still occurs with stress. When I wear contacts, I can
see objects around me sharply, but the doubling that sometimes occurs is a
more intense experience: a clear double vision.
Below, I would like to continue my personal narrative of treatment for
diplopia in order to emphasize the ways in which vision therapy—rather
than an initially proposed surgery—influenced my ability to think about my
double vision in ways that were aesthetic—in Kuppers’s crip sense—rather
than medical. With the slow progress of vision therapy, I eventually came
to terms with vision as a processual and changing feature of my life, rather
than as a static and monocular construct with an “easy fix.”
Discourses of Medicalization
Walking into the children’s hospital in my 20’s was a surreal experience.
Sitting in the waiting room, I looked listlessly at the brightly colored toys
lining the floor, struggling to pull them in and out of focus. I was particularly
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 12, 2013: Sloan
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shocked that the specialist, an older man, was so quick to suggest eye
muscle surgery, even when surgeries of this kind often “improve cosmetic
appearance” alone, while “[n]umerous peer-reviewed scientific studies report
success rated for eye muscle surgeries ranging from 30% to 80%. In those
studies, the success is sometimes defined as “cosmetic improvement only”
(J. Cooper and R. Cooper, “Strabismus”). In his mind, strabismus, as was
common in his very young patients, was the only acceptable diagnosis for
my double vision; for him, this fairly invasive surgery, which he routinely
performed on childhood strabismus, was the only option to correct my
particular issue. Given my age, my case was unusual, so he merely insisted
that other doctors had missed my double vision for over a decade.
With futility, I tried to reorient myself through this diagnosis, his
diagnosis that came from a particular Western medical establishment, in a
pediatric hospital, from this doctor who was a specialist in making the same
diagnosis over and over. I simply could not believe that such a major aspect of
my life had escaped notice until my college years. Essentially, he wanted to
spread my eyelids widely for full access to my eyeballs, make an incision in
my lateral muscles to shorten them, and then fuse the muscles back together.
Bolting from the children’s hospital, my family and I proceeded to look into
less drastic measures.

Fig. 2. MRI scan of author’s brain.

Adult-onset eye issues of this magnitude are rare and are often symptoms
of greater problems, so late one Halloween night, I eventually submitted to
lying in the loud, whirring magnet for a few hours. Was it myasthenia gravis
or brain cancer? Trick or Treat? How might a cosmetic surgery mask this
8

deeper issue? I felt fortunate, lucky, and ecstatic that the test results came back
clean after a month of nervous waiting, but I had no new answers. Perhaps
I just had not noticed the doubling my entire life? I had no explanation, just
some amusing pictures of my brain and the experience of the doubling that
grew more intense with fatigue and anxiety.
Vision Therapy
A month’s research resulted in a specialist—a behavioral optometrist—
who greeted me warmly. I soon learned the difference between an
optometrist—a person with a major certification in the measurement and
prescription of eyeglasses and basic eye issues—and an ophthalmologist—
someone who has completed medical school in order to specialize in disorders
of the eye. In my situation, I found the latter looking to perform surgeries, with
the former—among those optometrists who were well-informed—seeking
alternative medical treatments. Actually, my vision therapist was quite
emphatic about patients avoiding the knife, especially with children who may
face a lifetime of repeat procedures as their delicate vision evolves over time.
Curiously, instead of using special prisms that would let me see
“normally” for the course of the therapy, this doctor prescribed lenses
which had a little less than the prism power that would let me see with
“perfect” vision. The lack of intensity pushed my eyes to continually work
to accommodate and fuse images in distance vision. With the correction,
headaches were slightly less common during the day, but with the use of
nightly computer eye exercises, I strained to focus until I was able to meet
certain levels of ocular competence. For these, I used a computer program
with opposing sets of random dot stereograms, similar to Magic Eye image
puzzles. Using three-dimensional glasses, the color-coded visual fields would
separate as I stressed the limits of my vision in order to see boxes in the
jumble of dots. I would register the location of the boxes—up, down, left,
or right—on the keypad, meeting a loud affirmative or ear-piercing negative
beep. Without the ability to lower the volume in this old DOS program, I
entertained the notion that behavior modification must have been part of the
treatment process. In reality, these tests were merely a metric to determine
how much my everyday use of fewer prisms caused my eye muscles and
brain’s interpretation of the optical signal to reorient over time. Finding out
that the exercises were not doing the work of “recovery” part-way through the
process, I was annoyed but far from angry. There was something comfortable
about the numbers which denoted my progress through an exercise, and I
watched the prisms in my glasses drop: from six, to five, to four.
I mention these corrective strategies for at least two reasons. First, I
would certainly like to advocate for non-invasive and alternative therapy
practices in Western medicine; along with many others, I believe that a wider
variety of legitimate treatment and preventative options exist outside of go-to
surgical (Cassels; Makary) and pharmaceutical (Bass; Petersen) treatments
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 12, 2013: Sloan
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that often prop up an unhealthy corporate environment in the health care
profession. Secondly, however, I would like to visit the idea that medical
orthopedics can be a legitimate “imperfect” corrective, in that one need not
maintain the rhetoric of “the complete recovery.” The moment my prism
lenses were right for my progress toward the “center,” the doctor would give
me a prism sticker—a plastic lens to affix to my glasses—or a new glass
lens which made it harder to focus. The goal may have been eliminating the
two images before me for a single one, but the method did not follow the
surgical logic of a single-day’s fix and recovery. Rather, the milieu of vision
therapy followed the notion that I would definitely live with this condition;
I would gain a measure of control or a way of functioning with it over time.
However, even as I shed the prismatic lenses—moving in power from four
to three—I could not shake off the memory of the headaches, the doubling,
and the corrective therapy with its triumphs, setbacks, and many beeps. The
tedium was met with more visits to my orthoptic doctor friend and fewer
prisms: four turned into three, three to two.
An Aesthetic Awakening
For that period of time in my life—while going through vision therapy—I
reveled in being able to see with both a respect for the center, when seeing
“normally,” and an appreciation for a crip aesthetic, when seeing double.
With corrective prisms, I could not help but see singular; with mere contacts,
I could not help but see double. However, with this, my aesthetic appreciation
was widened and complicated. For instance, repetition in art and performance
became heightened. Repetitive paintings often appeared beautifully threedimensional; stage scenes with multiple characters would overlap, creating
depth and signifiers of multiplicity. In this mindset, I was able to actively
frame an art object as doubled specifically in my vision, rather than as justdoubled-like-everything-else.
Superimposition, the placing of one eye’s object on top of the other,
became an art I could perform in my own head. While doubled, I would
willingly contort my head to make things line up; in fact, when two people
were standing side-by-side with their four apparent bodies, it was more
comfortable—i.e., less migraine inducing—to make the two middle bodies
overlap heads or shapes, condensing down to three bodies. Perhaps this
practice reduced the number of people or objects to track visually, or maybe
the overlapping was interesting enough to make a perpetually uncomfortable
situation more palatable. My relative lack of control of the constant
superimposition led me to embrace this crip aesthetic of looking, which
felt somewhere between intentional and compulsory, somewhere between
beautiful and nauseating. As Ferris writes, “I’m not sure if I want all poems
to limp, but I know this: all the interesting ones do, all the lovely ones do, in
one way or another” (qtd. in Kuppers 93). As the heft of the prisms reduced,
I felt the weight of their absence on my face: from two to one, to none.
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Even after vision therapy, I wonder how I have actually “recovered”
from this ordeal, this “diplopic episode.” I still regularly use glasses, as
I have for nearly two decades, but I now choose whether to use prism
correction. Since I have spent so much time at the cusp of not being able
to fuse images in my visual system, I can cause my eyes to converge or
separate easily. To recall Rhonda Blair’s biological basis for acting, in true
Stanislavskian fashion, I am able to produce an “as-if” body state, based on
“recollections and reconstitutions of conscious and somatic experiences”
and “imagination” of what that experience was actually like (79). This
phenomenological reminder of a former state is just as disconcerting—or
aesthetically engaging—as the original condition. It also brings back body
memories of that early disorientation, and sometimes my eyes seem to want
to quickly fuse back, just to make sure they can. Sometimes they can, but
with fatigue, often they fail. As with many embodiments in life, over time, I
have learned to regard—rather than discard—this extra information which
re-performs the world. I have articulated this process of fusing a singular,
monocular perspective for myself, in a way that does not allow me to take
for granted the complexities of vision.
My vision therapist assured me that I was retraining my eye muscles and
the brain’s connection to them, my overall sight. Though areas of the brain
have certain plasticity, much of the brain’s ability to recreate and relearn
neural pathways is reduced throughout adulthood. Indeed, he mentioned that
I may not be able to “reclaim” my former vision—whatever that was—at all.
In a sense, he was right; my experiences will forever inform my vision. From
the position of Kuppers’s crip ideology, which champions non-normative
aesthetics, my overall experience with double vision has been a positive and
enlightening one.
A Diplopic Aesthetic in Performance
Returning to a practical discussion of staging double vision, this
section will tie my personal experiences with diplopia into a codified list of
three basic criteria for applying the experience as a visual aesthetic. I have
generated three criteria—of repetition, proximity, and hybridization—to
reflect some of the particularities of my experience in navigating the world
with double vision. Although the particularities of my experience serve as
case study in the application of biology to performance, I hope that readers
take away the urge to stage or leave traces of their own unique body states
in their work.
In applying a crip aesthetic to performance, Kuppers talks about the
notion of “biological determinism” as a call for “leaving traces in language”
to describe the experiences of bodies that function in other ways, outside of
the “normal” conventions (94-95). For my involvement in this aesthetic, I can
tell you my story or encourage you to cross your eyes for a day, for a time.
Perhaps a crip biological reference embedded in this essay will reach you in
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 12, 2013: Sloan
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its use of metaphor or meta-analysis; perhaps my performance of diplopia
on the page will cause you to look twice or to complicate the act of looking,
reducing its givenness. Consider vision both as an active performance
of dialogue—with internal (inter-ocular) and external (interpersonal)
negotiations—and as a substantive performative act in locating a meaning
for signifiers, a performative view.
In this way, vision—particularly directed at performance—is not just
a gaze or a means of apprehending the clarity or “meaning” of a scene.
Rather, the theater of looking is a constructed, political act that carries
the subjectivity of the performer and the weight of the multiplicity of an
audience’s interpretations. In the space of performance, audience and
performer co-create consensual meanings, even as each appears to hide
the reality of her own interiority. So, it is with the utmost respect for a crip
sensibility that I lay out three criteria for the particularities of my diplopic
aesthetic, criteria that are by no means an exhaustive list of the possibilities
for what could be a diplopic performance. Rather, I offer them as examples
of sensory embodiments from my own life that can make their way into a
performance that employs double vision as a staging device.
Repetition
First, a director or group of collaborators should pay special attention
to repetition in any visual stage imagery. The use of repetition—particularly
the act producing at least two of any single object or character—is a device
used to indicate literal multiplicity in the visual frame; it functions similarly
to the way that I orient to the presence of two copies of the same object in
my visual field when I have double vision. As a rule, the general notion of
doubling or multiplying—e.g., people, objects, set pieces—should be present
in the form of extra copies of things: characters have nearby doppelgängers;
items always appear in multiple; and set pieces are chosen for their natural
tendency toward repetition, like slats in chairs and porches. Performers
can definitely apply a “poor theatre” perspective—one that is “without
make-up, without autonomic costume and scenography, without a separate
performance area (stage), without lighting and sound effects, etc.”—to a
diplopic production, but such a work would likely emphasize the doubling
of characters or other elements of staging, such as the close placement of
audience rows (Grotowski 19).
Proximity
Second, performers in this style who are “doubled” should remain
in close proximity to each other where all movements are choreographed
and matched by both performers. Whereas practices such as character
bifurcation—where two performers may represent or embody one character—
are already widely used in performance studies productions, this diplopic
performance would be more of a pre-configured simultaneous dance with
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rigid blocking. I could also imagine the use of life-sized puppets for this
purpose, but I think that most diplopic performances could be accomplished
through media and video representation of two split visual fields captured
by a pair of cameras or the image from one camera duplicated.
Hybridization
Third, diplopic performances should emphasize the hybridization that
takes place when two pairs of bodies or objects begin to overlap. Through the
use of blending voices, costumes, character affects, or digital superimposition
of video, one can use the hybrid aspect of my diplopic aesthetic to look at the
everyday blending of hybrid subjectivities. For instance, imagine a meeting
of two doubled characters that form a total of four onstage performers.
To perform the kind of superimposition present in Fig. 3, the closest two
performers may overlap physically or temporarily combine costumes
or characterizations to show the visual and conceptual blending of two
subjectivities. In part, I see this as the most potentially subversive aspect of
a diplopic aesthetic because of the possibilities for strong juxtapositions of
body types, genders, races, ideologies, and personalities. When two dissimilar
entities overlap in this way, they may soon separate, but the conceptual
implication is that, as beings-in-the-world, we are always generating reality
and being affected viscerally by exchanges with others. I find the challenge
of staging such juxtaposition—or of producing one through digital media—to
be thought-provoking in terms of how identities are created, recreated, and
fluid. So, having laid out my tripartite criteria for a diplopic aesthetic, I will
now discuss possibilities for these techniques in digital media—where I
believe this particular aesthetic has the most potential.
Mediated Representations

Fig. 3 Screenshots from “Diplopic Vision,” a video by and featuring the author.

In my experience, I have been unable to locate a performance—outside
of taking off those special glasses during a 3-D movie—that employs these
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criteria—of repetition, proximity, and hybridization—in a way that reflects
the particularities of my diplopic experiences. One could certainly look at
the 3-D film technology as an analogue for stereoscopic vision, but I am
interested in the preservation of diplopia as an aesthetic record of a bodily
sensation. On this note, I can envision using digital media in order to create
this aesthetic in art, as seen in Fig. 3. In this instance, I used video editing
software to create a digital superimposition: a doubling of some footage
from my childhood. In each of the two images, note the slight difference in
opacity between “left” and “right” entities, the overlapping bodies, and the
birds and figures in the background that are now duplicates. The doubled
image on the right shows the way that multiplicity factors into this aesthetic
as a sparsely populated beach becomes one full of activity. Small groups
of people quickly balloon into crowds, and the number “one” no longer
functions as a representative signifier of any individual or observable entity.
One could create similar images by using two cameras with overlapping
fields of vision or with the new 3-D technology being built into and used by
cutting-edge cameras and handheld devices. The two cameras or lenses of
this process would satisfy my criteria for repetition, as there are two images:
for proximity, as the digitally combined images show objects in close, locked
relationships; and for hybridization, as bodies and objects overlap—giving
an illusion of hand-holding in Fig. 3. As in binaural recording, which uses
two microphones to simulate input from both ears, the use of two cameras
can simulate the vision from two different eyes.
These digital renderings of my diplopic aesthetic fall within Bourriaud’s
ideas in his book Postproduction, in which Bourriaud asserts that an artist can
generate new digital materials to be modified or work “with objects that are
already in circulation on the cultural market, which is to say, objects already
informed by other objects” (13). Like the re-used home movies in Fig. 3, one
may take already existing texts and manipulate them, remix them, as a form
of Brechtian defamiliarization or commentary on the original image. I can
imagine elements of close repetition and proximity producing multiplicity
in images with this method; I also envision the hybridization aspect of a
diplopic aesthetic being used in digital collage to emphasize the remix—or
overlap—of two already existent texts that are dissimilar. For instance, my
use of a particular home movie as the subject of “Diplopic Vision” allows
for a metaphoric and a literal doubling of a past and present self.
I realize that there may be other creative ways, perhaps a use of mirror
or sound, to embody my diplopic aesthetic and other bodily realities which
would also follow Kuppers’s notion of a crip aesthetic: presenting nonnormative possibilities for the senses. Art, in this vein, is certainly made for
venues like psychology textbooks to show what synesthesia or so-called
sensory disorders might look like. However, that art is often made with
the idea of representing and confirming pathologization—of improving
normative treatment models so that temporarily-abled psychologists can more
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efficiently recognize those whom they believe have a disability. I believe
in alternative, aesthetic universes of reference which would reclaim—or
begin to free—entrenched signifier/signified relationships that occur when
artists represent the world of bodily experiences. This is a way of thinking
that attempts to avoid medicalization in favor of a broader perspective of
consensual reality.
Though, in this writing, I do not wish to normalize any particular body.
My aesthetics of looking may invoke a diplopic aesthetic, but there might be
someone missing an eye who would have a monocular aesthetic: a monocular
aesthetic of a different kind than those who forget—optocentrically—that
they have two. I’m not talking about theoretical lenses here; I’m talking about
biological lenses. If we are to fetishize visual culture, I believe the least we
can do is to make sure that different types of vision are seen as both present
and presently working in aesthetic objects and performances.
In light of this, I hope artists will begin to interpret the world through
their own perspective, their own visual world, with all its complications. What
about a farsighted staging or one that makes present the fact that the human
eye often receives a yellow tint with age (Wolfe, Kluender, & Levi 112)?
My argument here is one of addressing the formal aspects of a production, of
making present the frame of a performance or adding to the complexity of a
scene. Certainly, one might argue that a shift in color onstage or an alternative
camera position would be imperceptible to an audience, but I would put forth
that embedding things like a character’s (dis)ability into staging choices adds
to the conceptual complexity, the richness of a conspicuous performance.
For instance, a director might tint part of the stage with a slight yellow gel
when the scene is situated in the perspective of an older character whose eyes
have begun to (dis)color. In order to use an aesthetic of the eye condition
retinitis pigmentosa, a director might occlude part of—or the center of—the
stage from being lit in order to re-create this experience where “sufferers
typically exhibit an overall shrinkage of their visual fields, as well as ‘ring
sarcomas,’ bands of blindness between the relatively normal central visual
fields and the periphery” (Wolfe, Kluender, & Levi 44).
Suffice to say, not all productions would benefit from this kind of artistic
practice. Rather, I would only advocate using a kind of crip or bodily aesthetic
in a situation in which it makes sense for the overall goals of the artwork in
development. I would like to return to Kuppers, who links her crip aesthetic
back to the body:
I can perform biological determinism, the living nature of
flesh, in writerly practice, the site where language knits
meaning. I can show crip culture poetry as a site of these
performances, of living life. I can show how these poets
craft a suspension, lift of line. New alignments can be
made, and the very notion of biology becomes playful. . . .
In his crippled poetics, Ferris loves limping poems, finding
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 12, 2013: Sloan
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beauty in the irregular, finding himself and more than
himself: finding openings in those certainties of his bodily
life, . . . knowing that these are also words to play with,
material for making gorgeous things, risky things. (94)
Here, I do not seek to dis-identify with the notion of my diplopia as disability,
but I am also aware that body politics can often circulate in degrees of
intensity and authenticity. In my contribution to an understanding of a crip
aesthetic, I hope to speak with rather than for the beauty and body that can
accompany this kind of art-making. Therefore, I do not wish to claim a
grand authenticity in the disability world from my subject position as an
otherwise temporarily-abled body. But, in this movement, I also do not
wish to create a hierarchy which would discourage a director from using
or making salient, for example, a basic nearsighted or farsighted aesthetic
in staging: perhaps making a stage very far away, very close-up, or visible
only through a tinted set. This essay and its broader research project serve to
interrogate monocular optocentrism in visual art and rhetoric while providing
my personal frame of diplopia as a tool or heuristic for staging multiplicity in
performance. In this way, I view my experience with diplopia in opposition
to my former and current states of “singular,” temporarily-abled vision. My
disorienting personal narrative serves as a record of my experience, a crip
possibility of sight. My performance of double vision can then be located in
my narrative writings of the experience, the drama of corrective strategies,
the audiencing of my body’s differing interpretation of the visual world, and
in the remembered coping mechanisms—such as looking in-between two
of the same object.
Coda
My visual sensation has entered a new evolution which resembles its
former state, but my indoctrination back into singular vision is not—and
can never be—complete. Stress and fatigue hail the return of the doubling.
Even after acquiring orthoptic corrections and eliminating prismatic glasses,
I still revel in this strange thing my body does, that I do. After all, I have a
measure of limited control. I can choose to fight the splitting or choose to
keep it doubled, orienting differently to my disorientation. I do not know
any longer if a “normalized body,” if there is such a thing, has this kind of
control over perception, but the experience drives me to question what visual
aesthetics, social processes, artistic practices, and cultural stories create this
“normalization.”
I believe that we must tell our defamiliarizing stories of body—our
disorienting stories of experience—through autoethnographic work. I believe
that these stories can also be embedded in our staging and composition
practices, rather than being outright expositions. Even if they are not fully
understood—in the logical sense—they can be felt and can serve as witness to
the fullness of the human experience, to all of the possibilities of polyphony
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present in consensual reality. I am not concerned with my three criteria for
a diplopic aesthetic encompassing my entire experience with double vision,
and I am equally uninterested in my audience coming to exactly my same
sense-making position on the polyphonic nature of reality. Rather, I hope
that readers will take the meaning that they need to take from my personal
narrative and reflect upon their own lives for traces of their physical bodies
that can work their way into art-making practices. Life is messy, short, and
complicated, and I think art, at its best, should reflect that.
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